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I. INTRODUCTION
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ????????? ????????????? ?????????1 Certainly, there are struggles over the costs to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
injuries, but those costs have been going down.2 In general, workplaces have become safer, 
                                                          
 1. For an entertaining introductory podcast see Alan S. Pierce, Are Workers’ Comp Benefits Adequate?,
LEGAL TALK NETWORK (Feb. 23, 2017), https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/workers-comp-
matters/2017/02/workers-comp-benefits-adequate/. 
 2. Employer costs have fluctuated, rising during the Great Recession but recently declining to historically 
low levels. See NAT?L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., WORKERS? COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS 
1
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which probably explains the decline.3????????????????????????????????????????????????
these days, it is most often in connection with scandalous fraud or outrageous, if sometimes 
anecdotal, stories of under-compensation which generate allegations of unconstitutional 
benefit inadequacy.4 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ??????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???? ???????????????????
compensation rights to benefits and tort immunity?was purportedly constitutionally 
premised on a notion of r?????????? ????????? ????????????? ?????????5 Implicit in the 
exchange was that some tort law beneficiaries (both defendants and plaintiffs) were giving 
up, ex ante, what would have matured into ascertainable tort damages (or defenses).6 Other 
???????????????sation statutory beneficiaries would receive windfalls as the victims of 
pure accident (claimants) or as the perpetrators of negligent harms (employers). 
Nevertheless, the question of benefit adequacy is important to those directly impacted by 
injury and can assume heightened societal importance whenever it is proposed that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? for example, 
to the medical malpractice tort regime.7
??? ???? ????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ????????????? ????????se was worked out 
behind a veil of ignorance because no one could know, in advance, the identities of future 
winners and losers under the new law.8 Still, no one could have doubted the fact that there 
would be winners and losers. Possession of a tort right was, and is, mere potentiality until 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
quo is typically conceived,9 and this article will continue to speak within that framework. 
                                                          
(2017), https://www.nasi.org/research/2017/report-workers%E2%80%99-compensation-benefits-coverage-
costs-%E2%80%93-2015.  
3. See Louise Esola, Comp Rates Set to Continue Downward Trend in 2018, BUS. INS. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20171011/NEWS08/912316461/Workers-compensation-rates-set-
to-continue-downward-trend-in-2018. The reader will note the discrepancy between falling carrier rates and 
rising employer costs. A full discussion of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article but has very 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4. See Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workers-compensation (highlighting benefit inadequacy 
through statistics and case studies). There are exceptions, however. See Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, 
Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to Ditch Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp (featuring corporate 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5. See infra Part II. 
 6. This problem was dealt with in a view very early compensation statutes by allowing an employee to elect 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????personal negligence. See, e.g.,
Providing Compensation for Persons Injured in Certain Hazardous Industries 1911 Kans. Sess. Laws 382, § 2. 
But this approach was very quickly dispensed with as statutes continued to be enacted in the 1910s. See U.S.
DEP?T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN?S COMP. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES, Bulletin No. 203 (1917????????????????U.S. DEP?T OF LABOR???
7. See generally Alexander Volokh, Medical Malpractice as Workers’ Comp: Overcoming State 
Constitutional Barriers to Tort Reform, 67 EMORY L. J. 975 (2018). 
8. See Original Position, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 4?7 (2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/original-position/.    
 9. For a recent example, see Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, No. 117,725, slip op. 116483 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Aug. 3, 2018), http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2018/20180803/117725.pdf 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
2
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???? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???? ???? ?????????
compensation founders thought about benefit adequacy rather than assessing whether 
present benefits are in fact adequate. But ??????????????????????????????????????????????
benefits were originally reasonable often becomes intertwined with assessments of their 
???????? ??????????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ?????????
compensation bargain, employees who might have been bona fide tort victims were limited 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for medical expenses10 resulting from work-related injuries. One measure of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????its might therefore be the extent to which 
they corresponded (or continue to correspond) to the expected value of foregone tort 
damages. The problem with this measure is that most negligence cases are imperfect; they 
will yield something less than the theoretical maximum value of a given claim.11 In 
addition to complications associated with calculating the expected values of specific 
litigated cases, there are valuation problems across legal epochs. As jurisdictions have 
dispensed with all-or-nothing negligence defenses?contributory negligence and 
assumption of the risk,12 part of13 ?????????????????????????????????-defense-death-knell of 
many work injuries under the old tort regime14?the original valuation of cases across a 
range of possible values has probably ????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????????? ?????????????? ?? ??????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ????15 In a similar vein, the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Accidents (and plaintiffs) in the 21st century may be foreseeable in a way that would not 
have been possible in the early twentieth century,16 ????????????????????????????????????
originated. On the other hand, cumulative, or gradual, injuries of a kind probably not under 
contemplation at the time of the original quid pro quo, but sometimes covered under the 
???????? ????????? ????????????? ???????17 would be difficult to conceive under a 
                                                          
likely to produce lower benefits in violation of the quid pro quo under Kansas law). 
 10. Though in the very earliest statutes some states did not provide for payment of medical expense at all, 
some states provided only very limited medical benefits (more like first aid) for a short period of time 
immediately following a work-related injury a maximum of perhaps 60 days, some states paid medical benefits 
only in the case of the death of the injured worker, and in all cases where medical benefits were paid they were 
strictly capped. See HARRY B. BRADBURY, WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 190?205 (1912). 
 11. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ???????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? Some Thoughts About the Economics of 
Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 1137 (2009). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suits with Negative 
Expected Value, Faculty Discussion Paper No. 256, Harv. Center for L. & Econ.  (1997), in 3 The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 551?54 (1998), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/Negati 
ve-Expected-Value-Suit.pdf. 
12. See Marianne M. Jennings, The Impact of Alternative Negligence Defense Rules on Litigation Behavior 
and Tort Claim Disposition, 5 BYU J. PUB. L. 33 (1991). 
 13. The third such defense was the fellow-servant rule?the employer was not vicariously liable to an 
employee for the negligence of a co-employee. 
 14. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526?27 (4th ed. 1971). 
15. See Padgett v. State, No. 11-13661 CA 25, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014) (dismissed 
on procedural grounds) (trial judge arguing reopener theory). 
16. See Meiring de Villiers, Foreseeability Decoded, 16 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 343, 344?45 (2015) 
(discussing changing notions of foreseeability as technology and scientific knowledge advance). 
 17. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a good example. See generally 4 LARSON?S WORKERS? COMPENSATION LAW
3
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foreseeability-based tort regime.18 ???? ???????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????????????
structure taking these modern variables into account would doubtless require mind-
bogglingly complex actuarial assessment. In any event, as some plaintiffs have been 
arguing,19 given the immense shift represented by the establishment of a comparative 
negligence regime, it is plausible that employees would never have agreed to the tradeoff.20
Nevertheless, with respect to the victims of pure accident, the same conversation is 
inapt. Because these victims would not have been compensated under the tort regime of 
1911,21 ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????? ???? ????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????
compensation, almost by definition, functions as a form of social insurance.22 Although 
????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ?????????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ???? ??? ???????? ?????????
compensation policy discussions is usually not acknowledged. 
Social insurance analyses of benefit adequacy often frankly admit the absence of 
consensus on the meaning of benefit inadequacy.23 Social insurance analysts also 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
States that is easily accessible to academic researchers. Over the last thirty years, for 
example, it appears that few comparative empirical studies of benefit levels have been 
completed by only a handful of academic social science researchers.24 Despite this 
shortcoming, in the evolution of w???????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????? ??????????
                                                          
§ 50.01. 
18. See generally ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Mound No. 1) 
[1961] UKPC 1, [1961] AC 388, [1961] 1 All ER 404 (Jan. 18, 1961) (holding tort damages not available in 
absence of foreseeability of type of damage plaintiff suffered). That cumulative injuries were not contemplated 
is suggested by the very ???????? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ????????? ?????? ???? ????????? ????????? ?????????
compensation statutes. See generally infra Part III.  
19. See ?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6277356; Brief for Petitioner, Stahl v. Hialeah Hosp., 182 So.3d 635 (Fla. 2015) (No. SC15-725), 2015 WL 
6951096. 
 20. Assuming one believes there was ever truly broad employee assent. Scholars have persuasively made the 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????ime represented a multilateral agreement between various 
stakeholders. See generally PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS? COMPENSATION (2000).  Unions were weak?union density was roughly 
5.5% in 1910?roughly 2 million workers out of a working population of 38 million were union members. See 
LEO WOLMAN, UNION MEMBERSHIP IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Bulletin 68 (1937), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5410.pdf ). Leaders of organized 
??????? ????? ????????????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????? ?????????? ???? ????? ??????????? ????????? ?????????
compensation because they felt it could not be properly negotiated?as they argued it should be?within 
collective bargaining agreements. See generally Robert Asher, The Ignored Precedent: Samuel Gompers and 
Workers’ Compensation, 4 NEW LAB. REV. 51 (1982). 
 21. ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????stems were first enacted. See generally infra
Part III.   
 22. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????generally as a form of 
social insurance. See H. ALLAN HUNT & MARCUS DILLENDER, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP?T RESEARCH,
WORKERS? COMPENSATION, ANALYSIS FOR ITS SECOND CENTURY (2017), 
http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1262&context=up_press. 
 23. H. ALLAN HUNT, NAT?L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., ADEQUACY OF EARNINGS REPLACEMENT IN WORKERS?
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: A REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL ON BENEFIT ADEQUACY OF THE WORKERS?
COMPENSATION STEERING COMMITTEE 19?23 (2004). 
 24. For a review of the existing studies, see HUNT & DILLENDER, supra note 22, at 5?30. 
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theories of benefit adequacy have emerged.25 The study and articulation of these theories 
is important; but the present inquiry is more narrowly focused. In this article, the inquiry 
will be what early architec?????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
While society is not necessarily bound by what those architects thought, understanding 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
should inform present discussions of benefit adequacy.26
The difficulty with such an inquiry, however, is that early American courts made 
few attempts to explain why workers compensation benefit levels, purportedly established 
as a quid pro quo for tort damages, were reasonable. Part II of this article analyzes some 
of the decisions issued by those early courts, and highlights language from the decisions 
???????? ????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ????????? ????? ??????
consideration was presumed but never explained. Part III of the article explores early 
?????????????????? ????????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ???????? ???? ??????-sector
stakeholders?beginning in 1909?that were inspired by an investigative team sponsored 
by the Russell Sage Foundation,27 and initiated b?? ???? ?????????? ???????????
Compensation Commission.28 ?????? ?????????????? ???????? ????????? ?????????
compensation systems, some of which had already been substantially in place for a quarter-
?????????????? ??? ????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????nsation statutes in 
1910-1911.29 A second similar investigation and analysis was conducted roughly two years 
later by the National Association of Manufacturers.30 This article concludes31 that already 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????cially the German and English 
systems, and close American expert policy scrutiny of those systems, persuaded the U.S. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
act32 during the height of the Lochner era.33 In retrospect, the Court may have been 
extending its conceptions of state police power to allow for a form of rational basis review 
of industry-??????????? ??????????? ??? ?? ???????????? ????????34 From the perspective of 
                                                          
 25. HUNT, supra note 23, at 19?23. 
 26. On reimagining the social contract, see generally Josh Friedman and Michael Lind, The Past and Future 
of America’s Social Contract, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/12 
/the-past-and-future-of-americas-social-contract/282511/.   
 27. LEE K. FRANKEL & MILES M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN?S INSURANCE IN EUROPE (1910),
https://www.russellsage.org/sites/default/files/Frankel.Dawson.Dublin_Workingmen_0.pdf. 
 28. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENTS, Atlantic City, New Jersey (1909). 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. See infra Part III. 
32. See infra Part III. 
33. See David A. Strauss, Why was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 374 (2003) (discussing a 
common view that the U.S. Supreme Court, as reflected in Lochner v. New York?????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
those rights are as much the product of state action a????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Court decided Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, in 1905, yet the 1917?????????????????????????????????????????????????
willing to interfere with private contracts between employers and employees. See generally infra Part II.   
 34. ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? The 
Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1640?41 (2016). 
5
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????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????????? ?????????
????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ???? ?????????????????? ??? ???? ?????????
compensation system under the United States Constitution. At most, the Court suggested 
the existence of a benefit floor, and held that the statutes it was reviewing had not fallen 
beneath that floor.   
II. BENEFIT ADEQUACY AS REASONABLENESS AND THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE 
IMPLICATION
In the early part of the 20th century, in response to an epidemic of workplace injuries 
occasioned by the intensifying industrial revolution,35 states began to experiment with 
???????????? ????? ????????? ????????? ????????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???? ???? ????36
Similar developments had been unfolding in Europe since about 1875.37 This Part 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
States. 
A. From Ives to White
In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,38 the New York Court of Appeals struck as 
un???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????39 While not quibbling 
with the police power authority of the state to correct social evils,40 the Court found that, 
by imposing upon employers liability without fault for employee workplace injuries, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
state Constitutions . . ??41 ?????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????
means law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, and that is but 
????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of in accordance with those ancient and fundamental principles which were in existence 
?????????????????????????????????????42 Thus, Ives ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??? ????????????????????????????????
to assume that the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution incorporated those principles 
??? ???? ???????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????43 The day after Ives was decided, the infamous 
Triangle Shirt Waist fire killed approximately one-hundred and fifty workers in New York 
City.44 The publicity in connection with the fire is often regarded as a significant 
                                                          
 35. Mark Aldrich, History of Workplace Safety in the United States, 1880-1970, EH.NET,
https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-workplace-safety-in-the-united-states-1880-1970-2/. 
36. See infra Part III. 
 37. FRANKEL AND DAWSON, WORKINGMEN?S INSURANCE IN EUROPE 74 (discussing partial implementation 
????????????????????compensation principles applicable to railway and steamship companies in Switzerland). 
 38. 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
 39. ??? ??????????????? ??????? ????????????? ????????????? ?????????? ?? ?????????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ????
employments and a compulsory statute applicable only to ultra-hazardous employment. FISHBACK & KANTOR,
supra note 20, at 96. It was obviously the compulsory statute that was contentious. 
40. Ives, 94 N.E. at 437. 
41. Id. at 439. 
42. Id.
43. Id.
 44. PETER M. LENCIS, WORKERS???OMPENSATION: A REFERENCE AND GUIDE 12 (1998). 
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motivating factor for subsequent amendment of the New York Constitution to allow for 
????????????? ?? ???????????????? ????????????? ????????45 The constitutional amendment 
provided in relevant part: 
Nothing contained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the 
legislature to enact laws . . . for the payment . . . of compensation for injuries to 
employees or for death of employees resulting from such injuries without regard to 
fault as a cause thereof . . . or to provide that the right of such compensation, and 
the remedy therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries 
to employees or for death resulting from such injuries.46
Thus, the state law constitutional basis for Ives?? ????????????? ??? ???? ???? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????al constitutional questions had yet to 
be resolved. 
The impact of Ives throughout the United States was significant. Seven states, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
certain that compensation legislation ?????? ??? ???????47 In 1911, several states were 
???????? ?????????????????? ????????????? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? Ives,
decided to create non-compulsory laws permitting employers to elect whether to 
??????????????????????????????????????????ms.48 While some commentators have believed 
that Ives did not in reality represent the majority of legal and judicial opinion at the time, 
???? ??????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????? ????????????? ???????? ???????????? ?????????? ????? ??????
legislatures.49
Whereas Ives had been employer-centric in its focus?discussing almost exclusively 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
compensation laws? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in New York, New York Cent. R. Co. v. White,50 discussed the common-law rights of both 
employers and employees.51 ???? ????????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ?????????
                                                          
45. Id. at 12; HERMAN MILES SOMERS AND ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION,
PREVENTION, INSURANCE AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 32 (1954). 
 46. N.Y. CONST. of 1894, Art. 1, § 19 (1914). 
 47. SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 45, at 32. The states were Arizona, California, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id. at 32 n.26. 
 48. Id. at 32. 
49. Id. at 32 ?????????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ????????? ?????????????? ??????? ????????????????????
compensation statutes in N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), see infra at n.50 and accompanying 
text, the following states enacted elective, rather than compulsory, statutes: Kansas (1911), Massachusetts (1911), 
New Hampshire (1911), New Jersey (1911), Wisconsin (1911), Michigan (1912), Rhode Island (1912), 
Connecticut (1913), Iowa (1913), Minnesota (1913), Nebraska (1913), Nevada (1913), Oregon (1913), Texas 
(1913), West Virginia (1913), Louisiana (1914), Kentucky (1914), Colorado (1915), Indiana (1915), Maine 
(1915), Montana (1915), Pennsylvania (1915), Vermont (1915), Delaware (1917), and South Dakota 1917. After 
1917, the eight states enacting elective statutes were located in the South: Virginia (1918), Alabama (1919), 
Tennessee (1919), Missouri (1919), Georgia (1920), North Carolina (1929), Florida (1935), and South Carolina 
(1935). FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 20, at 103?04 tbl. 4.3. Of these states, only Texas remains elective.  
 50. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The administrative decision below affirming t??????????????????????????????????
benefits was upheld in the New York appellate courts without opinion in light of the intervening amendment of 
the state constitution and the subsequent upholding of the Act under the amended constitution in Jensen v. 
Southern Pac. Co. 109 N.E. 600 (N.Y. 1915), rev’d on other grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 51. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????prive plaintiff in error of its property without 
7
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compensation award, rendered in favor of the family of a deceased employee,52 on much 
the same grounds as had been the case in Ives.53 On this occasion, however, the issues were 
purely federal and decided by the United States Supreme Court rather than the New York 
Court of Appeals.54 Just as the New York courts had in Ives, the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the involved emp???????? ????????? ???????55 But the Supreme Court also 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the states to establish by legislation departures from the fellow-servant rule and other 
common-???? ?????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ????
??????????56 Such departures, while justified, were limited,57 and it was unnecessary 
for the purposes of the present case, to say that a state might, without violence to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
law rules respecting liability as between employer and employee, without providing 
a reasonably just substitute. Considering the vast industrial organization of the state 
of New York, for instance, with hundreds of thousands of plants and millions of 
wage earners, each employer, on the one hand, having embarked his capital, and 
each employee, on the other, having taken up his particular mode of earning a 
livelihood, in reliance upon the probable permanence of an established body of law 
governing the relation, it perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish 
all rights of action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting 
up something adequate in their stead. No such question is here presented, and we 
intimate no opinion upon it.58
                                                          
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
White, 243 U.S. at 191. With respect to employees, the Court said, 
In considering the constitutional question, it is necessary to view the matter from the standpoint of 
the employee as well as from that of the employer. For, while plaintiff in error is an employer, and 
cannot succeed without showing that its rights as such are infringed . . . yet . . . the exemption from 
further liability is an essential part of the scheme, so that the statute, if invalid as against the employee, 
is invalid as against the employer. 
Id. at 197 (citations omitted). 
52. Id. at 191.  
53. Id.; see supra notes 38?39 and accompanying text.  
54. White, 243 U.S. at 196?97. 
The scheme of the act is so wide a departure from common-law standards respecting the responsibility 
of employer to employee that doubts naturally have been raised respecting its constitutional validity. 
The adverse considerations urged or suggested in this case and in kindred cases submitted at the same 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
to a liability for compensation without regard to any neglect or default on his part or on the part of 
any other person for whom he is responsible, and in spite of the fact that the injury may be solely 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
i?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with the damages actually sustained, and is limited to the measure of compensation prescribed by the 
act; and (c) that both employer and employee are deprived of their liberty to acquire property by being 
prevented from making such agreement as they choose respecting the terms of the employment. 
Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 200. 
57. Id. at 201. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). The implication is that the New York system then before the Supreme Court was 
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  For the Court, no such question was presented because 
it is not unreasonable for the state, while relieving the employer from responsibility 
for damages measured by common-law standards and payable in cases where he or 
those for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at fault, to require him to 
contribute a reasonable amount, and according to a reasonable and definite scale, 
by way of compensation for the loss of earning power incurred in the common 
enterprise, irrespective of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire 
loss to rest where it may chance to fall, that is, upon the injured employee or his 
dependents. Nor can it be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
risk of injury in ordinary cases, and in others had a right to recover an amount more 
or less speculative upon proving facts of negligence that often were difficult to 
prove, and substitute a system under which, in all ordinary cases of accidental 
injury, he is sure of a definite and easily ascertained compensation, not being 
obliged to assume the entire loss in any case, but in all cases assuming any loss 
beyond the prescribed scale.59
None of this was to say, 
that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, on the one hand, 
or onerous, on the other, would be supportable. In this case, no criticism 
is made on the ground that the compensation prescribed by the statute in 
question is unreasonable in amount, either in general or in the particular 
case. Any question of that kind may be met when it arises.60
One especially underappreciated aspect of White ???????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??????????
respecting their interests, grounded in property and contract, the Court stated the 
following: 
The subject matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is the matter 
of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the course of 
hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as affecting the 
??????????????????????hole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when 
the individual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-maiming 
and attempts at suicide; it may prohibit a man from bartering away his life or his 
personal security; indeed, the right to these is often declared, in bills of rights, to 
be ‘natural and inalienable;’ and the authority to prohibit contracts made in 
derogation of a lawfully-established policy of the state respecting compensation for 
accidental death or disabling personal injury is equally clear.61
Thus, the Supreme Court described life and personal security as inalienable rights 
that a state could justifiably prioritize over rights of contract and property depending on 
the circumstances. This emphasis on inalienability, when read in proper context, explained 
                                                          
clearly adequate. 
59. White, 243 U.S. at 203?04. 
60. Id. at 205. 
61. Id. at 206?07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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why the state could prohibit contracts that would waive rights to any remedy for personal 
injury. 
B. Murky Judicial Negative Implications Not Clarified 
White has never been overruled,62 but has often been understood in terms of what it 
claimed not to be saying. It represents, in other words, a species of negative pregnant 
propositions, or rather a series of them?? ?? ????????? ????????? ??? ?? ???????? ????????? ????
affirmative opposite by seeming to deny only a qualification of the allegation and not the 
???????????????????63 White’s negative pregnants included the following: 
? It is unnecessary to say that a state might (without triggering due process 
concerns) set aside all rules of employer-employee liability ?without providing 
a reasonably just substitute.?64
? ?[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the state could abolish all rights of 
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up 
something adequate in their stead.?65
? ?None of this was to say, that any scale of compensation, however insignificant, 
on the one hand, or onerous, on the other, would be supportable.?66
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sufficiently insignificant remedy was provided under the New York statute, but implicit in 
the denial was the affirmative opposite of the proposition. If, generally, a substitute remedy 
was unjust, or inadequate, or insignificant then ???? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ????
process, be subject to doubt, or be insupportable. 
The problem, of course, is how to interpret such statements now given the evolution 
of constitutional doctrine. When White has been mentioned in modern quid pro quo theory 
cases,67 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????68 the 
usual response by courts is to say that it is not clear that a quid pro quo for deprivation of 
tort rights is constitutionally required but, even if it is, the statute in question provides 
adequate substitute tort remedies.69 That reasoning is circular without a baseline, however, 
and in the absence of defining adequacy such utterances are conclusory. Courts might, of 
course, simply say that White is archaic and should be abandoned; but they do not seem 
quite willing to do so. The problem with simply abandoning White ??? ?????????
                                                          
 62. The due process-quid pro quo principle White appears to stand for remains an arguably open question at 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ision in Fein v. Permanente 
Medical Group 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (White, J., dissenting), where Justice White made this claim. Indeed, that is 
largely the point of this article. 
 63. Negative Pregnant, BLACK?S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
64. See White, 243 U.S. at 201. 
65. Id. (emphasis added). 
66. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
 67. As of this writing, research revealed five such cases: Ileto v. Glock, Inc. 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F.Supp. 40 (W.D. Tenn. 1940); Lash v. State, 14 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 1943); 
Lash v. State, 14 So. 2d 235 (Ala. Ct. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
Super. Ct. May 2011).  
68. See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1126; Gilland, WL 2479693 No. X04-CV-0950327655. 
 69. This was precisely the approach taken in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 
U.S. 59, 88, n.32 (1978). 
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compensation contexts is that it is often regarded as the Rosetta Stone to original 
??????????????? ?????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????? ????? ??????? ??? ????
always seemed to offend legal sensibilities to agree that a legislature could establish any 
substantive parameters it wished.70 The proposition leads too easily to the possibility that 
a state legislature could eliminate injury remedies altogether.  This is simply another face 
of the perennial tort reform debate on constitutional boundaries,71 and it is natural to read 
White as forestalling such an outcome. One has difficulty reading White without receiving 
the strong impression that the Supreme Court conditioned the quid pro quo on the 
availability of adequate or reasonable substitute remedies. 
In a case nearly contemporaneous with White, and again arising in the context of 
hazardous employment, Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington,72 the Court took up 
the question of employee benefits, though, as in White, it was the employer who had raised 
the question of the constitutionality of the statute.73
[W]hile plaintiff in error is an employer, and cannot succeed without showing that 
its constitutional rights as employer are infringed . . . yet it is evident that the 
??????????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????????? ????? ??? ????
legislative scheme and the quid pro quo for the burdens imposed upon him, so that 
if the act is not valid as against employees, it is not valid as against employers . . . 
However, so far as the interests of employees and their dependents are concerned, 
this act is not distinguishable in any point raising a constitutional difficulty from 
????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????White].74
Thus, the two 1917 foundat?????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????
compensation systems, as applied to hazardous employment, offered little indication of 
how reasonableness or adequacy was to be assessed apart from vaguely approving as 
adequate the statutory structure then under consideration.75 It is perhaps surprising that the 
?????? ????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ????????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ????? ???? ??????? ????
repeatedly pointed out that no one had a vested right in a rule of the common law.76 Yet, 
the question of reasonableness to employees was nevertheless addressed in Mountain 
                                                          
70. See T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism, 44 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
71. See generally Volokh, supra note 7. 
 72. 243 U.S. 219 (1917).  
 73. Id. at 227?28. 
74. Id. at 234 (citations omitted). In fact, the employee benefits available under the Washington statute 
differed substantially from those available under the New York statute. 
 75. The origin??? ??? ???? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
times the daily earnings capped at $3000; 50% of the average weekly wage if totally incapacitated and if partially 
incapacitated in the case of partial incapacity the weekly payment shall in no case exceed the difference between 
the amount of the average weekly earnings of the workman before the accident and the average weekly amount 
which he is earning or is able to earn in the same employment or otherwise after the accident, but shall amount 
to one-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
suffered, nor shall any weekly payment payable under this article in any event exceed ten dollars a week or 
extend over ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????49. 
 76. Munn v. Ill.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of 
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005). 
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Timber and White virtually sua sponte.77
??? ??? ????????? ??? ????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ???????????????? ????? ??????New York 
Central R.R. Co. v. Bianc,78 and Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,79 as both endorsing and
restricting a muscular legislative supremacy welded to federalism. In Bianc,80 the Court 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????
?????????????? ????? ?????? ??? ??????? ??? ??? ??????????? ???????? ????????? ???? ?????
established.81 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????82 the Court said, 
If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured 
workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether 
the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common 
law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair 
result, is for the state itself to determine.83
  In the five cases that were consolidated in the Arizona Copper cases84 the Court 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d them 
of liberty and property. The employers had objected to several features of the law, and the 
Court responded in a manner that could just as easily be applied to employee benefits as 
employer defenses: 
Some expressions contained in our opinion in the White Case . . . are treated in 
argument as if they were equivalent to saying that if a state, in making a legislative 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-law system of basing 
responsibility upon fault, it must confine itself to a limited compensation, measured 
and ascertained according to the methods adopted in the compensation acts of the 
present day. Of course, nothing of the kind was intended. In a previous part of the 
opinion . . . it had been shown that the employer had no constitutional right to 
continued immunity from liability in the absence of negligence, nor to have the 
fellow servant rule and the rules respecting contributory negligence and assumption 
of risk remain unchanged. The statutory plan of compensation for injured workmen 
and the dependents of those fatally injured-an additional feature at variance with 
the common law-was then upheld; but, of course, without saying that no other 
would be constitutional.85
By implication, this passage suggests that the Arizona Copper Court would have 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
those workmen could have taken other (more meager) forms without offending the 
                                                          
77. See Mountain Timber, 243 U.S. 219 and accompanying text; see also the similar statements in White, 243
U.S. 188. 
 78. 250 U.S. 596 (1919). 
 79. 250 U.S. 400 (1919). 
80. Bianc, 250 U.S. at 600. 
 81. Id. at 601, 603. 
82. Id. at 601. 
83. Id. at 602 (quoting Arizona Copper Co., 250 U.S. at 429) (quotation marks omitted). 
84. Arizona Copper Co., 250 U.S. at 400. 
85. Id. at 428?29 (citations omitted). 
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Constitution. Bianc and Arizona Copper thus seemed to establish that states had very wide 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????86
????? ???? ?????? ???????? ???? ?????????????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ?????????
compensation statutes as applied to non-hazardous employments in the 1922 case Ward & 
Gow v. Krinsk,87 the Court was not presented with, and did not independently discuss, the 
adequacy or reasonableness of employee benefits. In its general defense of compulsory 
??????????????????ion systems and employee liability acts, however, the Court said, 
??????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
Liability Acts, as it has seemed to this court, is found in the public interest of the 
state in the lives and personal security of those who are under the protection of its 
laws, from which it follows that, when men are employed in hazardous occupations 
for gain, it is within the power of the state to charge the pecuniary losses arising 
from disabling or fatal personal injury, to some extent, at least, against the industry 
after the manner of casualty insurance, instead of allowing them to rest where they 
may happen to fall, upon the particular injured employees or their dependents, and 
to this end to require that the employer?he who organizes and directs the 
enterprise, hires the workmen, fixes the wages, sets a price upon the product, 
receives the gross proceeds, pays the costs and the losses, and takes for his reward 
the net profits, if any?shall make or secure to be made such compensation as 
reasonably may be prescribed, to be paid in the event of the injury or death of one 
of those employed, instead of permitting the entire risk to be assumed by the 
individuals immediately affected. In general, as in the New York law, provisions 
for compulsory compensation are made to apply only to those employed in 
hazardous occupations, where it may be contemplated by both parties in advance 
that sooner or later some of those employed probably will sustain accidental injury 
in the course of the employment, but where nobody can know in advance which 
particular employees or how many will be the victims, or how serious will be the 
injuries.88
Krinsky, while offering a much more sophisticated economic justification for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Throughout the decade, the Court accepted?in White, in Bianc, and now in Krinsky?that 
the New York schedule of benefits was fair, or adequate, or reasonable. But why? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by the courts was not likely the by-product of lack of political controversy, however. 
Benefit levels were, in fact, controversial throughout the United States during the period 
????????????????????????????????????????????????89  In an influential text on the origins of 
                                                          
86. Bianc, 250 U.S. at 602. 
 87. 259 U.S. 503 (1922). 
 88.  Id. at 512?13. 
 89. George Young, a Wyoming representative perhaps echoing some national sentiment, was not happy with 
the first decade of the twentieth century benefit levels in Wyoming: 
???? ????????????? ??????? ?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????
carries the very highest possible benefits. I want to say now that it is my honest conviction that the 
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workers?? ?????????????? The Prelude to the Welfare State, Price Fishback and Shawn 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
compensation statutes were being implemented in various states.90 The conclusion of these 
sch???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were influenced by workers, employers, and social reformers: ??????? ?????????
compensation benefits varied across states depended on the relative strength of the interest 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????91 This is what one would 
expect, leaving to one side doubts about widespread employee participation in the process 
(if nothing else, workers were voters).92 The benefit level debate must have proceeded 
from baselines, however. Where did the baselines originate? Although this Part has shown 
????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ???????????????? ????????
White???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????first opinion, and 
was, evidently, the touchstone for all that followed. Why was the Court convinced that the 
New York system was reasonable and adequate?93
III. 1917 CONTEXT
This Part discusses the social context in which the just discussed, seminal worker???
compensation cases were being decided. Specifically, it will show the constant interplay 
???????? ??????????? ???????? ???????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ?????????????
commissions appointed by governors and legislators during the first decade of the 
twentie?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
private actors crystalized options and was substantially responsible for creating the New 
York proto-statute that was ultimately ruled constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
White.   
A. Background 
It is easy for 21st century readers to underappreciate the magnitude of the late 19th
                                                          
benefits specified in this act are too low.  
It is true that we have no adequate figures at hand, that apply particularly to our State, that would let 
us accurately base a demand for higher rates with the certain knowledge that the fund accumulated 
would pay for them.  It is because of this, and because of the fact that presenting a demand for higher 
rates of compensation would open the way for all sorts of amendments to the bill, that I make this 
statement. The time for consideration of the bill is short; amendments here might encourage 
amendments elsewhere; opposition might be excited to the measure, and I want no act of mine to 
endanger the passage of the bill. 
H. Journal, 13th Leg. 329 (Wyo. 1915).  
 90. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 20, at 172. 
 91. Id. at 173. 
92. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND 
THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 9, 10 (2004). 
 93. Part of the equation probably has to do with the arguments parties were not advancing because of the 
procedural posture of cases. As the lead cases demonstrate, litigation was usually launched by companies 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
have been featured. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that employers could have aggressively pursued theories 
of employee benefit inadequacy as a strategy for scuttling the scheme. The Court demonstrated in both White
and Mountain Timber that it was willing to consider such arguments. 
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and early 20th ????????????????? ????????????????????????? ?????Fabian Witt has noted, 
policy makers and academics during this period ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????94??????????????????? ??????????????? ???????? ????????
compensation statutes were already in existence beginning in the late 19th century, and 
??????? ???? ?? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ?????????
compensation systems.95
Witt also notes that: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
statutes became a topic of serious of conversation in American 
legislatures, teams of reformers and academics travelled to Europe under 
the aegis of such organizations as the Russell Sage Foundation, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the Department of Labor to 
see for themselves how other nations dealt with accident compensation.96
This article contends that it was dialogue between the teams Witt mentions and state 
commissions that created benchmarks of adequacy against which the Supreme Court 
considered the New York statute, sub silentio. The teams? stated objective was the creation 
of a uniform law that could be tested against constitutional challenge in impact litigation.97
??????????????? ????????????? ?????????????? ??? ????? ???????? ??????????????? ???????????98
though o????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????down by 
the New York Court of Appeals.99 The process resembled a regulatory negotiation 
resulting in consensus standards.100 Broad, extra-legal negotiation was not unknown to 
policy makers of the early 20th century, and an apt comparison could be made to mostly 
private labor-management negotiation of the federal Railway Labor Act in 1926.101
Viewed in this way, White ???? ???? ???????? ????? ???????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ??????
informally-appointed, quasi-political commissions played the role of ad hoc expert 
agencies involved in analysis of a national problem during a period preceding the mature 
federal administrative state.102 It is true, of course, that deferring to experts reveals only 
what is reasonable and not what is unreasonable, and that is perhaps a good way to explain 
some of the modern disutility of White. Still, glimpsing the nature of expert opinion of the 
                                                          
 94. WITT, supra note 92, at 9. 
 95. See Joseph LaDou, The European Influence on Workers’ Compensation Reform in the United States, 10 
ENVIRON. HEALTH 103 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3267658/. 
96. WITT, supra note 92, at 10 n.42. 
 97. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 51?52 (1909), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9. 
98. See, e.g. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENTS 39?43 (1910), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951002082754 [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. 
99. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 431, 438-42 (1911). 
 100. See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L. REV. 1, 35 (1982) 
(discussing the ways in which private negotiation can resemble regulatory negotiation).   
101. See Laurence Scott Zakson, Railway Labor Legislation 1888-1930: A Legal History of Congressional 
Labor relations Policy, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 317, 362 n.247 (1989) (describing six months of conferencing between 
representatives of labor and management which produced a proposal that would become in all important respects 
the Railway Labor Act of 1926). 
 102. This conceptualization gives renewed emphasis to the excellent title of Price Fishback and Shawn 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????. See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 39. One might add, 
????????????????[Administrative] ???????
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1910s provide insight into the contemporaneous scope of reasonableness which probably 
influenced the Court. 
B. The 1909/1910 National Conference on Workmen’s Compensation for Industrial 
Accidents: The Minnesota Initiative 
The first of the important expert bodies of the decade was the National Conference 
??? ?????????????????????????????ustrial Accidents. On July 29, 1909, a conference on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
the conference sent to invitees stated: 
You are, invited to be present at The Marlborough-Blenheim, at Atlantic City, July 
29-31 and take part in a conference with the various State and Government officials 
and others interested in legislation changing the basis of recovery, for injuries 
received in the course of employment from that of negligence or fault of the 
employer, to that of risk of the industry or insurance; at which conference the 
persons whose names appear under the several subjects will be asked to lead the 
discussions along the respective lines appearing in the program herein. You are 
requested to extend this invitation to such persons as can contribute knowledge on 
the subject.103
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????104
A second such conference was held on January 20, 1910, and a third on June 10, 1910.105
One could argue, based upon these conferences, that the Minnesota Commission was a 
?????? ?????? ??? ????????? ????????? ????????????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????
???????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??? ???????????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ?????????????
commissions or delegations from Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York (Crystal Eastman 
appeared, among others), Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland, and 
Connecticut,106 ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
date.107 The Commission explained that after identify?????????????????????????????????????
compensation conversation at a Minnesota State Bar Association meeting in 1908, the Bar 
Association created a Minnesota Commission comprised of various stakeholders from 
within the state.108 The newly-minted Commission widely canvassed a range of opinion 
on the failings of the tort system to remedy workplace injuries. Eventually, the 
Commission, with the assistance of various commentators, drew up a Model Code, which 
it distributed and discussed at the June 10 meeting.109
The Code would apply to all employers and not just those engaged in extrahazardous 
                                                          
 103. PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION FOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
prefatory note (1909), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000094435;view=1up;seq=9 [hereinafter 
PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE]. 
104. Id.
 105. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 3.  
106. Id. at 10?38. 
 107. Id. at 33?38. 
108. Id. at 33. 
 109. Id. at 40?43. 
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industries.110 For injuries resulting in immediate death, death occurring within five years, 
or total incapacity of five years or longer, the Code would have provided sixty percent of 
wages the injured worker was receiving at time of injury, for a period of five years, up to 
a maximum of three-thousand dollars.111 For incapacity lasting fewer than five years, the 
Code would have provided sixty-percent of the pre-injury wage, or sixty-percent of the 
wage-loss occasioned by the injury, depending on whether incapacity was total or 
partial.112 In addition, the Code would have provided for a schedule of supplemental 
benefits when certain parts of the body were injured: forty percent of pre-injury wages for 
five years for loss of both feet, both hands, or a foot and a hand;113 fifteen percent of pre-
injury wages for five years for loss of a foot, a hand or an eye.114 ???????????????????????
of the scheduled body parts could be adjusted proportionally.115 However, limits applied 
to the stacking of benefits: in no instance could all benefits exceed what the injured worker 
had been earning in wages at the time of injury; and in no event could all benefits received 
exceed five thousand dollars.116 The Code would not have provided for payment of 
medical expenses incurred as a result of work-related injuries. 
The treatment of extrahazardous employments was novel.117 Although several of the 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????includ???????????????
were elective, or voluntary, for non-extrahazardous employers, the Code would have 
defined hazardous employment sufficiently broadly that any employer experiencing an 
accident was essentially hazardous.118 Thus, as a practical matter, the Code would have 
been compulsory for most employers and employees. Additionally, the remedies for work-
related injuries as defined in the Code would have been exclusive: 
Sec. 4. Repeal of other liabilities. The right to compensation and the remedy 
therefor, as ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
injuries and awards upon which they are based as to all persons covered by this act, 
whether formerly authorized or allowed by, or as the result of, either state, statute 
or common law, and no other compensation, right of action, damages or liability, 
either for such injuries or for any result thereof, either in favor of those covered by 
this act or against such employer based on state law, shall hereafter be allowed for 
such injuries to any persons or for any of the injuries covered by this act so long as 
this law shall remain in force, unless, and then only to the extent, that this law shall 
???????????????????????119
                                                          
110. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 99, at 40. 
111. Id. This amount equals roughly $80,000 in 2018 dollars. This and all upcoming inflation conversions for 
weekly benefit amounts are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator, 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
112. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 40. Wage-loss benefits would be 
obtained by subtracting post-injury wages from the pre-injury wage and taking sixty-percent of the difference. 
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 40?41. 
116. Id. at 41. About $132,600 in 2018 dollars. 
 117. PROCEEDINGS, THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 98, at 54, 85. 
 118. Id. at 47. 
119. Id. at 41. 
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In reflecting upon the proposed Code, it should be born in mind that the Minnesota 
Commission had reportedly gathered information and data from the states of 
Massachusetts, Illinois, and New York; it sought but could not obtain relevant data from 
various charities, unions, or (at least at that time) from the National Association of 
Manufacturers; it wrote to conservative labor leader Samuel Gompers, who, interestingly, 
had not yet adequately studied the matter; it wrote to radical labor leader Eugene Debs, 
who had studied the matter more comprehensively than Gompers and provided 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
communicated with industrialist Andrew Carnegie, who said he preferred the English 
system.120 The Minnesota Commission was aware of the various constitutional challenges 
likely to be raised, and addressed them in its report.121
The Minnesota Commission made direct contact with the Russell Sage Foundation 
investigators who were studying ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
during the summer of 1908.122 After establishing the Russell Sage contacts, the Minnesota 
Commission invited the investigators to the conference of July 1909, thereby sharing with 
state officials, and others, details of the operation of European and British Commonwealth 
systems,123 some of which had been in existence since 1877.124 Dr. Lee K. Frankel, one of 
the principal Russell Sage Foundation investigators, candidly stated at the July 1909 
conference: 
I hope that the outcome of this meeting will be some effort toward uniformity in 
legislation. You will notice that I have refrained from expressing any opinion as to 
whether any of the foreign systems are adaptable to the United States. My own 
thought is that between the compulsory scheme in Germany and the purely 
compensatory scheme in England we shall find some sort of a mean that is 
adaptable to and that can be practically administered in the United States. We shall 
probably find that such a scheme will be adaptable not only to one but to all of our 
states. Except so far as their geographical situation is concerned, and so far as there 
may be certain industries in certain localities, there are not sufficient differences 
between our states to warrant us in having different legislation in each state. If this 
meeting can do nothing else than to get together on some uniform basis, it would 
be doing a great deal. I thoroughly believe that if we are ever to obtain such 
legislation here, it will have to be done by a concurrence of opinion on the part of 
such commissions as are already created, so that each one shall be able to 
recommend to their respective legislatures a draft of a bill with the statement that 
this draft has been accepted by the commissions of other states. The moral force of 
such a statement in the beginning of new legislation cannot be over-estimated.125
The statement strongly suggests that from the beginning of serious national 
                                                          
120. Id. 34?35. 
121. Id. at 35. 
 122. PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 103, at 13?14. 
 123. Id. at 231?44 (testimony of Dr. Lee K. Frankel discussing the systems of England, Sweden, Belgium, 
France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland). 
124. Id. at 237?38. 
125. Id. at 243. 
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????????????? ??? ????????? ?????????????involving state commissions,126 academics, 
NGOs, and insurance companies127?national uniformity was an important goal, and 
European systems were to be studied closely and emulated wherever possible.  The 
statement also suggests that, despite broad conversation on several European laws, the 
German and English systems were quickly the leading candidates for emulation. From the 
point of view of employee benefits,128 what were the differences between the German and 
English systems? A summary comparison prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 
1917, helps to explain the features of the two systems as they would have existed in around 
the first decade of the twentieth century, when the National Conferences were being 
held.129
1. The German System 
The German Act was first enacted in 1884, and then amended several times.130 The 
Code of 1911 compensated injuries by accident in the course of the employment, causing 
death, or disability for more than three days, unless caused intentionally by the injured 
worker.131 Compensation could be denied or reduced if injury was sustained while the 
worker was committing an illegal act.132 A variety of industries were covered, and while 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????133 Importantly, voluntary coverage of 
employers not under the jurisdiction of the law could be approved by the State, upon 
request. The statute covered medical and surgical treatment for ninety-one days following 
the injury.134 Benefit payments from the beginning of the fourth to the ninety-first day 
were provided by sick-benefit funds, to which employers contributed one-third and 
employees two-thirds. From the beginning of twenty-ninth day post-injury, to the ninety-
first day, payments were increased by one-third, solely at the expense of the involved 
employer. After the ninety-first day, and in case of death from injuries, the expense of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of employers (but not employees).135
Compensation for death included: 
                                                          
126. Id. at 1?2. Present at the first conference were members of the state commissions (or other state officials) 
from Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington D.C., and New York. 
127. PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 103, at 1?2. The list of attendees at the first 
conference included executives or representatives from Aetna Life Insurance Co., Travelers Insurance Co., 
General Accident Insurance Corporation, Fidelity and Casualty Co., United States Casualty Co., Ocean accident 
and Guaranty Co., Maryland Casualty Co., and Liability Insurance. 
 128. Structurally, the two systems were very different in that the German system compensated in an integrated 
manner sickness, workplace injury, and disability within an overall social insurance scheme while the British 
system was focused exclusively on workplace injuries. A full discussion of the many differences between the 
two systems is beyond the scope of this article. 
 129. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316?17.  
 130. Id. at 316.   
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.
 133. Id.
 134. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316. 
 135. Id.
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? Funeral benefits of one-fifteenth of annual earnings of deceased, but not less 
than 50 marks ($11.90). 
? Pensions to dependent heirs not exceeding 60% of annual earnings of the 
deceased.136
Compensation for disability was as follows: 
? Free medical and surgical treatment paid during the first 13 weeks of incapacity 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? For temporary or permanent total disability, 50% of daily wages of persons 
similarly employed, but not exceeding 3 marks (71 cents), paid by sick benefit 
funds from beginning of fourth day to end of fourth week; from fifth to end of 
thirteenth week, above allowance by sick benefit fund, plus 16 1/3% 
contributed by the employer directly; after 13 weeks, 66 2/3% of average 
annual earnings of injured person paid by employers associations. 
? For complete helplessness necessitating attendance, payments could be 
increased to 100% of annual earnings.   
? For partial disability, a corresponding reduction in payments was made. 
? If annual earnings [from benefits payments] exceeded 1,800 marks ($428.40), 
only one-third of the excess was considered in computing pensions. 
Benefit payments could be revised whenever a change in condition of an injured 
worker occurred.137
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????composed of Government 
officials and an equal number of representatives of employers and employees.138
2. The English System139
The English Act was first enacted in 1897, and the Russell Sage investigators would 
have been doing their work after the passage of a major amendment in 1906, which went 
into effect in 1907.140 The law compensated injuries by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employment, which caused death, or disabled a workman for at least one 
week from earning full wages.141 Compensation was not paid when injury resulted from 
the serious and willful misconduct of a worker, unless it caused death or serious and 
permanent disability.142 ????????????????????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????or business whose compensation was 
less than £250 ($1,216.63) per year (persons engaged exclusively in manual labor were 
not subject to this limitation).143 The Act applied to civilian persons employed under the 
Crown (government employees) as if the employer were a private person. The entire cost 
                                                          
 136. Id.
 137. Id.
 138. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 316. 
 139. Id. at 317. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.
 142. Id.
 143. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317. Roughly $32,300 in 2018 dollars. 
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of compensation rested upon the employer.144
    
Compensation for death included: 
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
than £300 ($1,459.95),145 to those entirely dependent on the earnings of the 
deceased. 
? A sum of less than the above amount if deceased left persons partially 
dependent on his or earnings, with the amount to be agreed upon by the parties 
or fixed by arbitration. 
? Reasonable expenses of medical attendance and burial, but not to exceed £10 
($48.67),146 if the deceased left no dependents. 
Compensation for disability included: 
? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
average weekly earnings during previous twelve months, but not exceeding £1 
($4.87)147 per week; if incapacity lasted less than two weeks no payment was 
required for the first week. 
? A weekly payment during partial disability, not exceeding the difference 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
amount which he or she was earning, or was able to earn, after injury. 
? ?????? ????????? ????????? ????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ???? ???????
benefits could not exceed 10 shillings ($2.43).148
? A sum sufficient to purchase a life annuity of 75% annual value of weekly 
payments could be substituted, on application of the employer, for weekly 
payments after six months; but other arrangements for redemption of weekly 
payments could be made by agreement between employer and employee.149
Weekly payments could be revised at the request of either party, under regulations 
issued by the secretary of state.150
Employers could make contracts with employees for substitution of a scheme of 
compensation, benefit, or insurance in place of the provisions of the act, if officials 
certified the scheme was not less favorable to the workmen and their dependents than the 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
substitute.151 The employer was then liable only for compliance with the provisions of the 
scheme.152
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
up to £100 ($486.65) in any individual case, was classed as a preferred claim.153
                                                          
 144. Id.
 145. Id. Not less than $19,344 or more than $38,725 in 2018 dollars. 
 146. Id. About $1291 in 2018 dollars. 
 147. Id. About $129 in 2018 dollars. 
 148. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317. About $64 in 2018 dollars. 
 149. Id.
 150. Id.
 151. Id.
 152. Id.
 153. U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 317. 
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Questions arising under the law were settled either by committee representatives of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or, if the parties could not agree, by the judge of the relevant county court, who could 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????154
Thus, the German and English systems paid indemnity benefits of between 50% and 
66 2/3% of the average weekly wage of the injured or deceased worker. The German 
system appears to have been substantially more generous than the English system with 
respect to medical benefits; and it is possible that those who favored the English system 
did so for this reason. Indeed, this may be understating the case because the English Act 
of 1906 contained no provision for payment of work injury-related medical benefits,155
while the German system typically provided full medical benefits for the duration of a 
disability caused by an accident.156 Eventually, in 1911, the English enacted a national 
health insurance law, the National Insurance Act of 1911, which effectively rendered moot 
nonc????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????157 The Insurance 
Act was ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
?????????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????? ????????? ????????????? ??????? ??????
discussion was a part.158
The German system also appeared to treat beneficiaries of workers killed by work-
related injuries more favorably than did the English system. 
C. The 1911 National Association of Manufacturers Report 
The Minnesota Commission was not alone in investigating the feasibility of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
systems, a process it was carrying out just as the Minnesota Commission was reporting 
findings in connection with its investigations. To this end, that organization dispatched 
???????? ??????????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ?? ????????????? ?????????????? ???????????
where the two men personally visited the countries of England, Germany, France, Austria, 
Hungary Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy.159 Each of these countries had already 
??????????????????????????????????????????160 The team produced an exhaustive report, 
                                                          
 154. Id.
 155. ?????????? ????????????? ???? ??? ?????? 6 Edw. VII, c.58, reprinted in 2 HARRY B. BRADBURY,
BRADBURY?S WORKMEN?S COMPENSATION AND STATE INSURANCE LAW 1735 (2nd. Ed. 1914). 
 156. Id.
157. See J. H. WATTS, THE LAW RELATING TO NATIONAL INSURANCE: WITH AN EXPLANATORY 
INTRODUCTION 76 (eds. Stevens & Sons 1913) (defining covered individuals as all persons employed).  
 158. Although beyond the scope of this article, the German code was actually three laws in one: the Health 
Insurance of Workers Law of 1883 (covering illness); the Accident Insurance Law of 1884 (work injuries); and 
the Old Age and Invalidity Law of 1889 (pensions and long-term total disability). CHRISTA ALTENSTETTER,
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, in Germany: A Country Study 200 (ed. Eric Solsten, 1996). 
 159. See FRED G. SCHWEDTMAN  & JAMES E. EMERY, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND RELIEF: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT IN EUROPE, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ENGLAND AND GERMANY:
TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA xxiii, 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030424603;view=1up;seq=29. 
160. See U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6. 
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which was adopted by the NAM. The document ran two hundred and sixty-nine pages, 
and, among other things, made an extended comparison of the English and German 
systems. As significant as the findings and conclusions reached by the drafters of the 
document turned out to be, the sheer number of sources relied upon to generate those 
findings and conclusions rendered it authoritative. Like the Russell Sage report, the NAM 
report resembled an expert governmental document. Many experts were consulted in the 
course of its creation, particularly from Germany.161 Moreover, the report claimed to have 
surveyed ten-thousand employers in advance of its issuance.162 The cover pages of the 
report bore the names of individuals drawn from an extremely broad swath of American 
industrialism.163 Notably, the report reflected, in those same cover pages, the name of J.M. 
??????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ???????????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??????? ??? ??????
Advisory Board of the Committee on Industrial Indemnity Insurance.164 A summary of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????liberations: 
? Limited compensation for work-related personal injuries already existed in the 
major European countries and British Colonies based on the recognition that 
industrial accidents are often simply unavoidable and the cost for those 
accidents should not be born exclusively by the workman but should be treated 
as a cost of production and spread accordingly.165
? Handling workplace injuries leads to bitterness and it was in the public interest 
to expedite the process.166
? Self-inflicted injury should result in reduced or no compensation.167
? All employments should be included in the system.168
? While the European systems were not perfect, they worked well enough to 
???????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ???? ???????? ????????? ??? ?????????
compensation was socially, economically, and industrially advantageous.169
? The proposed system could not work without vigorous accident prevention and 
provision to injured workers of first-aid without risk of diminished benefits.170
? Professional administrators were necessary to carry out the requirements of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.171
? ???? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ?????????
compensation because of its careful compilation of statistics and scientific 
study of accident avoidance (though many details of its administration were 
neither applicable nor desirable).172
                                                          
161. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 273?327 (reproducing approximately twenty-five uniformly 
positive letters from prominent German authorities on their impressions of the operation of the German system). 
 162. Id. at xiii. 
163. Id. at vii?xi. 
164. Id. at x. 
165. Id. at 259. 
166. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 259?60. 
167. Id. at 260. 
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 260. 
171. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 261. 
172. Id.
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? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
voluntary action or through permissive legislation and, in a large degree 
compelled b???????????173
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
loss of work capacity and was not based on fault.174
? If every employer became a limited insurer in law, it should also become an 
insurer in fact, and the obligation to pay into a common insurance fund should 
be a substitute for legal liability.175
? Limited compensation through insurance was most successfully obtained 
through creation of a fund administered by the state, or a fund supervised by 
the state, or through voluntary mutual associations, or in private insurance 
associations.176
? Employees should pay a small portion towards maintenance of the insurance 
fund to discourage fraudulent claims and encourage mutual cooperation.177
? A single liability (in other than exceptional cases??????????????????????????????
compensation system should discourage all other legal liability.178
? The principle of compensation should be universal, or it places unequal burdens 
??? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ????
employees.179
? Compensation in Europe was not regarded as a complete indemnity but as a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.?180
? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
nor breed paupers by corrupting thrif??? ????? ????????????????????? ???????181
were desirable, though employers should provide medical first aid during those 
waiting periods.182
? The system should feature cheap and expeditious adjustment of claims along 
the lines of European systems of arbitration, subject only to questions of law 
that may arise for the courts.183
? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????? ????? ???
substantially uniform or it would produce harmful conditions.184
NAM was aware that significant legal challenges to the system would occur but 
encouraged voluntary actions by private employers and implementation by states of 
                                                          
173. Id.
174. Id. at 262. 
175. Id.
176. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 263. 
177. Id.
178. Id. at 264. 
179. Id. at 265. 
180. Id. This, of course, is where all the fighting occurs. How substantial? 
 181. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 265. ?? ???????? ??????? ??? ?? ???????? ??? ????? ?????????
compensation systems and essentially excludes coverage of injuries unless disability lasts long enough to become 
compensable. The period in modern times extends from roughly one to three weeks. See  LEX K. LARSON,
LARSON?S WORKERS? COMPENSATION LAW 15, tbl. 14. 
182. SCHWEDTMAN & EMERY, supra note 159, at 265.  
183. Id. at 265?66. 
184. Id. at 266. 
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voluntary schemes of compensation until legal questions had been resolved 
Successful legislative action throughout Europe has been preceded by deliberate and 
painstaking investigation, extending in many instances through years of effort in the 
collection and comparison of information. We are fortunately able to avail ourselves of the 
??????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????????????????????????????ould make a start 
for ourselves here and now, providing at once for the accumulation in our respective states 
of that accurate information which is a basic necessity for intelligent action. Having once 
determined upon a rational policy of compensation, we believe rapid progress can be made 
in giving it appropriate legal form and adapting it to our customs and institutions. We should 
act now and as rapidly as is compatible with the greatness and complexity of the subject and 
its intimate relation to the prosperity of the employers and workmen of our country.185
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
next section discusses developments following the groundwork laid by the Minnesota 
Commission and the NAM report. 
D. The Role of the National Civic Federation 
Following the investigations and reporting of the Minnesota Commission Initiative 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????186 The NCF was organized in around 1900, 
and was initially formed around a program of conciliation and mediation between large 
unions and corporations.187 It was led by executives of very large companies and 
comprised of business, labor, and public interests.188 Samuel Gompers, for example, was 
a member of the NCF, and the organization had the reputation for both opposing the spread 
????????????????????????????????????????????????189 ?????????? ???????????????????????
enormous, and influential: 
By 1903 almost one-third of the 367 corporations with a capitalization of more than 
$10,000,000 were represented in the National Civic Federation, as were sixteen of the sixty-
seven largest railroads in the United States. Labor was also represented by its top leaders. 
Samuel Gompers was the original First Vice President of the Federation, a position he 
retained until his death in 1925. John Mitchell of the United Mine Workers was an active 
member and fulltime head of the Trade Agreements Department from 1908 to 1911. The 
heads of the major railroad brotherhoods and many A.F.L. international unions were also on 
the executive committee.190
This matters because, by 1908, the NCF had established an Industrial Insurance 
Commission which, while initially somewhat inactive, became much more active in 1909, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????191
                                                          
185. Id. at 268. 
 186. See James Weinstein, Big Business and the Origins of Workmen’s Compensation, 8 LAB. HIST. 156, 162
(1967).
 187. Id. at 162. 
188. Id. at 162?63.  
189. Id. at 163. 
190. Id. at 162. 
191. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 166. 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on Compensation for Industrial Accidents and their Prevention, and, thereafter, the NCF 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????192 Shortly after being assigned 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-drafting committee 
headed by former New York Commissioner of Labor, and conservative lawyer, P. 
Tecumseh Sherman.193 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???? ????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ????? ????????? ?????????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????
generate hostility and face constitutional hurdles.194 ?????????? ????????? ?????? bill was 
??????????? ??????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ??????????
commissions to study compensation, and governors of other states were urged to consider 
????? ?????????????195 The bill, which set out an elective, or voluntary, ?????????
compensation system for all but extra hazardous employments, elicited opposition from a 
variety of outside actors.196 The president of U.S. Steel, Raynall Bolling, for example, 
favored a universally compulsory system.197 Socialists and progressives favored state, 
rather than private, insurance funds, and wanted higher benefits.198 Even within the NCF, 
Hugh Mercer, who had served as Chair at the second National (Minnesota Commission) 
??????????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ?????????? ??????199 But Sherman thought 
????????? ?????????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ????????????
Russell Sage Foundation investigators) a radical, expensive preference of only ten states, 
and believed it should not be brought forward in the interest of supporting only a bill that 
would be widely accepted and become nationally uniform.200 By December 1910, the NCF 
was receiving regular requests for copies of the bill from governors and legislators all over 
the country.201 ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????? the Executive Council of 
the NCF.202 Following the amendment of the New York constitution to allow for a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
key parts of the final legislation.203 Thus a direct line can be traced from the Minnesota 
Commission, to the NAM report, to the NCF, and finally to the version of the New York 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Supreme Court in White.   
E. What Did the New York Statute Upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court Provide? 
The New York legislature enacted the statute eventually upheld in White on 
                                                          
192. Id.
193. Id. at 168. 
194. Id.
195. Id.
 196. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 168. 
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 168?69. 
200. Id. at 169. 
201. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 169.
202. Id. at 170. 
203. Id. at 171?74. 
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December 16, 1913, and the law went into effect on July 1, 1914.204 It compensated: 
 Accidental injuries arising out of and in course of employment, and disease or infection 
naturally and unavoidably resulting therefrom, causing disability for more than two weeks, 
or death, unless caused by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the 
injury or death of himself or another, or by his intoxication while on duty.205
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???????? ??????????????
??????????????????????????????
construction, maintenance and operation of steam and street railroads; telegraph, telephone, 
and other electrical construction, installation, operation, or repair; foundries, machine shops, 
and power plants; stone cutting, crushing, grinding, or dressing; manufactures, tanneries, 
laundries, printing, and bookbinding; shipbuilding and repair, and the use of vessels in 
intrastate commerce; work in mines, quarries, tunnels, subways, shaft sinking, etc.; 
engineering work, and the construction, repair, and demolition of buildings and bridges; 
lumbering, draying, loading, and unloading, ice harvesting, freight and passenger elevators, 
etc.206
All employees in covered industries were eligible, farm laborers and domestic 
servants were explicitly excluded from coverage by the statute.207 Public employment was 
explicitly covered under the statute.208 The entire cost of the insurance was born by the 
employer.209
Below are the guidelines the statute set forward for compensation after a work-
related death: 
? $100 for funeral expenses. 
? To a widow or dependent widower alone, 30% of wages of deceased, 10% 
additional for each child under 18; dependent orphans under 18 receive 15%, 
and dependent parents, brothers, or sisters receive 15%; aggregate payments in 
no case to exceed 66 2/3%. 
? Payments to widows or widowers ceased upon death or remarriage or when 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
payments to children, brothers, and sisters ceased at 18, and to parents when 
dependence ceased. In computing the above benefits no wages more than $100 
monthly were considered.210
Below are the guidelines the statute set forward for compensation after a work-
related disability: 
? Medical and surgical treatment and hospital services for 60 days, with costs to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 204. Summary provided in U.S. DEP?T OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 151. 
 205. Id.
 206. Id.
 207. Id.
 208. Id.
 209. Summary provided in U.S. DEP?T OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 151. 
 210. Id. (The maximum base wage rate was about $2,500 in 2018 dollars, which means that the maximum 
benefit (regardless how distributed) was about $1,667 per month. This inflation conversion is based on the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.).  
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? For total disability, 66 2/3% of wages during continuance. 
? For partial disability, 66 2/3% of wage loss; for specified permanent partial 
disabilities (mutilations, etc.), 66 2/3% of wages for fixed periods; there was a 
separate provision for disfigurements.211
The foregoing payments could not be less than $5 nor more than $15 per week,212
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????213
Awards could be reviewed, at any time, and ended or increased or decreased within the 
limits fixed depending on the disability status of the claimant.214
F. Assessing the Range of Reasonableness 
The statute enacted by New York in 1913 was at the conservative (it must be said), 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ly studied 
on a national level since 1908. The indemnity benefit level, though generally capped at 
$15 per week, resembled the structure of the English Act and, for lower income workers, 
paid fifteen percent more of the average weekly wage than the English Act. Moreover, 
??????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ????? ??????? ????????? ????????? ????????????? ??????????
compensation was paid for the duration of a disability, and was not terminated arbitrarily 
after a certain period.215 ???????????????????????????????????????????? on an ongoing 
basis, not as comprehensively as under the German system, but comparably to the English 
Act. Though the New York Act failed to pay for ongoing medical treatment necessitated 
by a work-related injury, the same was true of the English Act, and arguably of the German 
law.216 ???????????? ???? ???? ????? ????????? ????????????? ???????? ??????? ????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? th
century. And more importantly than how the statute seems retrospectively to a twenty-first 
century observer, it undoubtedly seemed reasonable (and like good policy) to a broad 
swath of contemporaneous experts.217 ???????????????????? ???????????????? ????????
                                                          
 211. Id.
 212. Id. In 2018 dollars, $126 per month would have been the minimum benefit and $378 the maximum 
benefit. The $20 maximum benefit where a maiming was involved would have been about $504 per week in 
2018 dollars. This inflation conversion is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.
 213. Summary provided in U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., WORKMEN?S COMP. STATS.,
Bulletin No. 203, supra note 6, at 151. 
 214. Id.
215. Compare John F. Burton, Report of the National Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Laws, 1 
WORKMEN?S COMP. L. REV????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????disability benefits concerns 
the total sum allowed and the duration of payments. Although there is wide agreement that payments for 
permanent total disability should be paid for life, we found that 19 States in 1972 failed to comply with that 
recommended standard. In 15 States, duration of payments was limited to 10 years or less and in 11 States the 
gross sum payable was less than $25,000, which is less than the average full-time worker in the United States 
???????????????????????
 216. Workers in each country were paid for work-related medical injury care under a national health insurance 
law, and at the time the Minnesota Commission and NAM investigators were doing their work England had not 
yet enacted such a law. See Watts, supra note 157, at 76; see also Altenstetter, supra note 158, at 200. 
 217. Following the Ives decision, the New York Commission (independently of the NCF) aggressively 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that explains the large amount of work the Commission completed states: 
The first and principal report is one of the most extended reports issued by a State commission.  Eleven 
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York statute (or its successors in other states) as unreasonable would have meant, as a 
?????????? ???????? ????????????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????????? ????? ????
alternative ideas in circulation as to how to replace the insufficient tort system. 
The Washington statute upheld in Mountain Timber provided fixed monthly benefits 
for both disability and death that were not based on a percentage of the average weekly 
wage.218 The Arizona statute upheld in the Arizona Copper cases provided total disability 
benefits based on fifty-?????????????????????????????????????????????ly earnings and, in 
the case of partial benefits, for only fifty-percent of injury related reduction in wages, with 
a lifetime cap on all disability benefits of four-thousand dollars.219 None of the early 
statutes provided work-injury medical benefits beyond sixty days. Was this an adequate 
exchange for the total relinquishment of tort rights? As discussed in Part II, the Supreme 
Court made no attempt to compare, in quantitative terms, the magnitude of benefits. One 
might infer that anything below fifty-percent of the average wage for ongoing disability 
might have been problematic for the Court. The complete absence of a death benefit might 
not have passed muster under the bargain.220 The important point is that the Supreme 
??????????????????????????????????????ts speaks volumes to its likely confidence in the level 
of sophistication and process that went into creation of the statutes. That sophistication 
essentially obviated the need for the Court to make any pronouncements on the 
importance, or constitutional status of tort rights, and whether those rights could, indeed, 
simply be swept away. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps some thoughts may now safely be completed. It is unnecessary to say that a 
state might (without triggering due process concerns) set aside all rules of employer-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????because here, in the 
New York workers’ compensation statute under consideration, there is a reasonably just 
                                                          
public hearings in various parts of the State, 14 executive sessions of the commission, and numerous 
meetings of committees and subcommittees indicate something of the activity of the commission in 
one direction. Inquiries were sent to 1,942 employers reporting accidents to the State department of 
labor, to 975 reporting accidents to the public-service commission, and to the presidents of 2,331 
labor organizations in the State. Several statistical studies were made as to the economic results of 
accidents and proceedings at law with reference to such accidents; also the cost of industrial accidents 
to employers and the distribution of such costs to hospitals for fees, insurance premiums, settlements, 
as damages, etc. 
U.S. DEP?T. OF LABOR, supra note 6, at 25. 
 218. Id. at 876?77 (In case of death $20 per month to the surviving spouse; $5 per month to each surviving 
child; maximum of $35 per month (roughly $900 in 2018 dollars). The same maximum applied to a married 
injured worker with dependents. For permanent partial disability the worker could receive a maximum of $1500 
(about $38,000 in 2018 dollars) regardless the duration of the disability). 
 219. Id. at 130 (The cap would be just over $100,000 in 2018 dollars). 
 220. Here, however, it should be remembered that wrongful death had been extinguished by the common law 
in the English case Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), and had to be revived in that country by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of variety in the statutes. See Frederick Davis, Wrongful Death, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 327, 329?31 (1973). It is 
?????????? ??? ???? ??? ???????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ??
windfall or loss to the survivors of victims of work-related injuries. 
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substitute.221 ????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????bolish all rights of 
action, on the one hand, or all defenses, on the other, without setting up something 
??????????????????????????but here something adequate has been set up in their stead.222
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????er insignificant, on the one 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????but here one need not reach the 
question because no such insignificant or onerous scale is present.223  How did the Court 
know the system under consideration was reasonably just, adequate, and provided a scale 
of compensation that was neither objectionably insignificant nor onerous? The Court did 
not say (other than perhaps to explain how much better off employees were to be out of 
the tedious, burdensome, unpredictable litigation system and to not have all the loss of an 
injury fall on them).224 But it seems extremely unlikely the Court was unaware that a 
massive, national conversation had been underway, during the eight years preceding 
White, conducted among high-ranking business leaders, progressive groups, labor unions, 
and academics, and that the statute before it was the fruit of those labors. One can perhaps 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-business, 
and not in the interest of workers.225 That view may presume that injured workers with 
valid tort claims would have sufficiently frequently prevailed under strengthening 
employer liability statutes to force employers to invest in safety, ultimately also inuring to 
the benefit of the victims of pure accident.226 Such a conclusion is easy to reach in 
hindsight, but probably misapprehends the urgency and intensity of the work injury 
problem. Despite all of this, it cannot be doubted that a compromise emerged from 
significant transoceanic process, and that the Court understood this was the case. 
The problem White leaves to posterity is one of unarticulated boundaries. 
Boundaries for employee benefits as a substitute for tort are said to exist, but are never 
delimited except by inference. A ????????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????
??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?????????227 Of course, as Professor Nachbar recently 
emphasized, throughout the Lochner era the Court approached the question of deprivation 
??? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????? ???
                                                          
221. ????????????????????????? ????us., 342 P.2d 218, 225 (Wash. 1959). 
222. Id.
223. Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219, 241 (1917). 
224. Id. at 238. 
225. See Weinstein, supra note 186, ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???????????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e
??????????????see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform,”
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 675?76 (1998) (criticizing a simplistic view of the quid pro quo and noting that, among 
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
term sacrifice of employer profit in exchange for longer term protection of capital from socialist organizing in 
the United States, as well as protection from proposals to copy the more comprehensive German model of 
disability compensation or to expand employer tort liability???
 226. ????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, or contributory negligence?to common law tort actions. See Mondou 
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co, 223 U.S. 1, 49 (1912). 
227. Schwedtman & Emery, supra note 159, at 265.  
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
personal security.228 Properly understood in constitutional terms, the foundational 
????????? ???????????n cases decided the power of a state, as limited by the 14th
amendment, to compel employers to provide insurance for their workers. The question of 
infringement on individual employee rights was peripheral, though considered. It is 
difficult to fault the Court for not precisely answering questions delineating the scope of 
individual rights (in this case, the common law tort right to a remedy for personal injury 
????? ????????? ????????????? ???? ??????????? ????? ??? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????
questions, and had only just begun to refine a language of individual fundamental rights.229
                                                          
 228. Nachbar, supra note 34, at 1641. 
229. Id. at 1640?41. 
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